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Abstract: This paper is dedicated to the subject of the relations binding British 
idealists’ thought to nineteenth and twentieth century disputes in political philosophy. 
The two of them are taken into consideration: liberal-conservative and liberal-
communitarian. The Author follows through the nuances of idealist thought in search 
of those of its elements, that weight in favour of its conciliatory, individualist-
communitarian character. The first step of the argument is the characterization of 
liberal-conservative/liberal-communitarian standpoints. Then some of the 
fundamental elements of idealists’ social and political thought are analyzed: the 
social recognition thesis, the concepts of common good and positive liberty. On this 
basis the following features are pointed to as crucial to accepting liberal-
communitarian/conservative character of the idealists’ theories: teleology; 
metaphysical foundation of politics; contextualism; a tension between ethical 
relativism and universalism; the criticism of the concept of negative freedom; and 
individualism. 
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When someone chooses for the subject of his analysis the uniqueness of the British 
idealists’ thought, this may entail considerations of various issues. For although 
sometimes the opinions appear that thinkers representative of this tradition blindly 
followed the ways paved by the German idealists, pointing to the counter-evidence to 
such a thesis is easy. The criticism of the reality of time by J.M.E. McTaggart, F.H. 
Bradley’s proofs of the contradictions inherent in discursive thinking, R.B. Haldane’s 
idealistic view of relativity, D.G. Ritchie’s Hegelian Darwinism – these are just the 
best known examples of British originality which took the whole idealist tradition to 
territories undeveloped by Germans. 
Similar originality is met on the ground of political philosophy. Although the 
thinkers discussed in this paper had for their chief inspiration classical German 
philosophy, their loose usage of Kantian, Hegelian and even Fichtean concepts 
resulted in thought incompatible with established theoretical divisions. Three main 
representatives of the idealist political philosophy have to be mentioned here: 
Thomas Hill Green, Francis Herbert Bradley and Bernard Bosanquet. The 
significance of their concepts becomes most clear attempting to describe them with 
contemporary philosophical notions. Such attepmts have recently been made e.g. by 
Gerald Gaus, Rex Martin, Avital Simhony, William Sweet, Colin Tyler and David 
Weinstein, who situated the idealist standpoint within the frames of the liberal-
communitarian and liberal-republican debate.1 Their approach  
                                                 
1
 G. Gaus, ‘Bosanquet’s Communitarian Defense of Economic Individualism: a Lesson in the 
Perplexities of Political Theory’, in: The New Liberalism. Reconciling Liberty with Community, ed. A. 
Simhony, D. Weinstein, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 137-58; R. Martin, ‘T.H. 
Green Complex Common Good: Between Liberalism and Communitarianism’, in: The New Liberalism, 
pp. 69-91; A. Simhony, ‘Rights that Bind: T. H. Green on Rights and Community’, in: T. H. Green. 
Ethics, Metaphysics and Political Philosophy, ed. M. Dimova-Cookson, W.J. Mander (Oxford, 
Clarendon Press, 2006), pp. 236-61; idem, ‘T. H. Green’s Complex Common Good: Between 
Liberalism and Communitarianism’, in: The New Liberalism, pp. 69-91; idem, ‘A Liberal Commitment to 
the Common Good: T. H. Green’s Social & Political Morality’, in: The Moral, Social and Political 
Philosophy of the British Idealists, ed. W. Sweet (Charlottesville, Imprint Academic, 2009), pp. 31-50; 
W. Sweet, ‘Individual Rights, Communitarianism and British Idealism’, in: The Bill of Rights. 
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is quite revolutionary from the perspective of the former ways of estimating the 
idealists’ intellectual heritage. For a long time, from the second decade of the 
twentieth century until the last, there was a widespread conviction that at least some 
idealists (Bradley and Bosanquet were mentioned here most often), took an illiberal 
standpoint, being, if not apologists of dictatorship, certainly the advocates of 
preserving the status quo. During the two past decades many papers have been 
published, in which the idealist tradition was portrayed as insisting not only on 
communal or social foundations of human consciousness, but also as strictly 
individualist, or at least liberal-communitarian/conservative. Of course the liberal-
communitarian interpretation in this context entails a lot of risk, since it seems to be 
exposed to the danger of anachronism, so convincingly described e.g. by Quentin 
Skinner. Nonetheless, there are many arguments in favour of admitting the affinities 
between idealistic and communitarian theories. Most of all it is the fact that some 
communitarians (namely Taylor and Sandel)2 admitted the existence of parallels 
between their critiques of Rawls’s Theory of Justice and Hegelian critique of Kantian 
ethics. Despite this argument, more methodologically secure seems to be the 
establishment of a linkage between idealism and conservatism.  
 
                                                                                                                                                        
Bicentennial Reflections, ed. Y. Hudson, C. Peden (New York, Edwin Mellen Press, 1993), pp. 261-77; 
idem, ‘Introduction: Rediscovering Bosanquet’, in: Bernard Bosanquet and the legacy of the British 
Idealism, ed. W. Sweet (Toronto-buffalo-London, University of Toronto Press, 2007), p. 23; C. Tyler, 
‘Contesting the Common Good: T. H. Green and Contemporary Republicanism’, in: T. H. Green. 
Ethics, Metaphysics, pp. 262-91; A. Simhony, D. Weinstein, ‘Introduction’, in: The New Liberalism, pp. 
1-25; D. Weinstein, ‘The New Liberalism and the Rejection of Utilitarianism’, in: The New Liberalism, 
pp. 159-83. 
2
 M. Sandel, ‘Introduction’, in: Liberalism and its Critics, ed. M. Sandel (New York, New York University 
Press, 1984), pp. 5, 7; Ch. Taylor, ‘Hegel: History and Politics’, in: Liberalism and its critics, pp. 177-
99. 
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Here probably the firmest example of such connections is the relation binding some 
idealists to Edmund Burke’s thought.3 
In this article I will analyze the possibility of positioning British idealists within the 
liberal-conservative or liberal-communitarian tradition and the theoretical basis of 
such ascription. I will present those elements of idealist theories which taken 
together, create a thought situated beyond the established theoretical divisions, 
especially that between communal/communitarian and individualist/liberal paradigms. 
The following elements will be considered: (1) Hegelian/Aristotelian teleology, (2) 
metaphysical foundation of politics, (3) ethical and legal contextualism, (4) constant 
idealist tension between unconditional acceptance of ‘my station and its duties’ and 
the ideals of social and non-social perfection, (5) the criticism of the liberal concept of 
negative freedom and the apology of freedom as positive self-determination and (6) 
individualism. Each of these elements will be later examined more thoroughly. Now 
let us start with the introduction concerning the nature of the mentioned philosophical 








                                                 
3
 It is well known that e.g. Green advised his student to study Burke’s writings (J. MacCunn, Six 
Radical Thinkers: Bentham, J. S. Mill, Cobden, Carlyle, Mazzini, T. H. Green (London Edward Arnold, 
1910), pp. 225-41; cf. R. H. Murray, Studies in the English Social and Political Thinkers of the 
Nineteenth Century, vol. 2 (Cambridge, W. Heffer, 1929), p. 288; J. R. Rodman, ‘Introduction’, in: The 
Political Theory of T. H. Green. Selected Writings, ed. J. R. Rodman, (New York, Appleton-Century-
Crofts, 1964), pp. 12-13). Another proof of such connections between idealism and conservatism may 
be the impact that idealism had e.g. on T.S. Elliot and Michael Oakeshott (both openly admitting the 
importance of Bradley’s writings in their intellectual development). 
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Liberal Conservatism. Liberal Communitarianism 
 
Contemporary debates in political philosophy are dominated by the criticism of both 
theoretical and practical implications of liberal theory. The attacks of communitarians 
and republicans have exposed the contradictions resting at the foundations of 
Rawls’s, Ronald Dworkin’s, or Nozick’s theories. Nonetheless some scholars point to 
the fact that both sides of this dispute substantially oversimplify its subject, i.e. the 
nature of liberal thought. They claim that there is no fundamental difference between 
the liberal and the communitarian (or republican) concepts of individual, community, 
freedom and rights. This is the opinion, for instance, of Thomas Spragens,4 who 
states that taking the atomist individualism to be a constitutive feature of liberal 
theory (and this is precisely what its adversaries are accustomed to do) is simply a 
misunderstanding. Of course, today’s liberal concepts (and this applies both to 
libertarians and egalitarians) are based on individualist methodology, 
acknowledgment of the primacy of rights over good, exaggeration of the value of 
particular persons and underestimation of the role played in their life by communities. 
But it was not always like this, as can be proved by analysis of the nature of liberal 
theory from the seventeenth until the nineteenth century. Let us make an example of 
Locke’s, Condorcet’s and J.S. Mill’s writings. Locke thought that the state ought to 
aim at the common good, and for the role of education in promoting virtue. More than 
once he referred to the law of nature as the source of moral imperatives, never being 
in favor of absolute, unrestricted freedom. Condorcet and Mill were joined in a belief 
that liberal society should contribute to the moral development of its citizens, as well 
as in their insistence on the necessity of social solidarity.  
                                                 
4
 T.A. Spragens, Jr., ‘Communitarian Liberalism’, in: New Communitarian Thinking: Persons, 
Institutions, and Communities, ed. A. Etzioni (Charlottesville, University of Virginia Press, 1995), pp. 
37-51. 
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They did not consider individuals apart from communities, rights apart from duties, 
they did not understand the relations between citizens and the state as antagonist in 
principle, but rather as mutually beneficial. Thus, contemporary communitarians do 
not oppose liberal thought in toto (as most of them wishes to do), but rather its 
twentieth century variant, strictly individualist, which is unrepresentative of whole 
liberal tradition.5 Most probably Locke, Condorcet and Mill, who had shared some of 
communitarian concerns, if they were still alive, would join such criticism. 
The list of thinkers whose writings disclose the same individualist-
communitarian feature is much longer. Charles Taylor suggests Wilhelm von 
Humboldt as one of them, Charles McCann holds that even philosophers considered 
the most individualistic of all liberal individualists: Herbert Spencer, Ludwig von Mises 
and Friedrich August von Hayek (he also mentions here J. S. Mill and William 
Graham Sumner) have never accepted views nowadays ascribed to them by 
communitarians or conservatives.6 In fact their thought contains many elements 
characteristic of the communitarian Weltanschaung. Polish scholar Jan Klos speaks 
directly of liberal-conservative philosophers intentionally uniting in their theories the 
elements typical to both disputed traditions. They constitute what Klos has called the 
nineteenth century ‘healthy liberal faction’. ‘This improvement – let us call it ... 
conservative – … consisted in exceeding the rationalist point of view, the modern 
ego-cogito attitude, scientific reasoning and opening to the integral vision of a  
 
 
                                                 
5
 Ibid., pp. 40-7. 
6
 Ch. Taylor, ‘Cross-Purposes: The Liberal-Communitarian Debate’, in: idem, Philosophical Arguments 
(Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1995), p. 185; C.R. McCann, Jr., Individualism and the 
Social Order. The Social Element in Liberal Thought (London-New York, Routledge, 2004). 
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man-as-a-whole: to tradition, community, religion’.7 These liberals were perfectly 
aware of the fact that without cultivating specific values and virtues, communities 
would not survive. Thus Klos’s thesis is that ‘not only does liberalism not exclude 
morality (as derived from Christianity); it cannot even exist without it, if it is still to be a 
support to its own fundamental values – freedom, individualism, progress. Every 
liberal-democratic order implies this sort of morality as its basis’.8 Klos named liberal 
reformers – Lord Acton, Frédéric Bastiat, Benjamin Constant, John Henry Newman, 
and Alexis de Tocqueville as such. 
These thinkers cannot, however, be called liberal communitarians sensu 
proprio, at least if we understand ‘communitarianism’ to be a particular political 
doctrine, and not just a pro-communal attitude. We may speak about liberal 
communitarianism in a strict sense only with reference to contemporary thinkers. 
Most commonly mentioned here are the ‘late’ John Rawls, Will Kymlicka, Charles 
Taylor, Michael Walzer, Amitai Etzioni, John Gray, William Galston, Judith Shklar, 
Joseph Raz, as well as Allen E. Buchanan, Gerald Dworkin, Joel Feinberg and Amy 
Gutmann. A common denominator of their theories is the acceptance of liberal 
society as the ground for dissolving ethical dilemmas. This results in appreciation, as 
David Miller has pointed out, of ‘the importance of autonomous choice: whichever 
way of life a person follows, it is important that he or she should have chosen to 
follow it after reflection on alternatives, rather than simply having been inducted into 
it’.9 Secondly, liberal communitarians are united in their opposition to abstract 
universalism, nowadays best represented by the works of ‘early’  
 
                                                 
7
 J. Kłos, Wolność, indywidualizm, postęp. Liberalizm konserwatywny wobec nowoczesności (Lublin, 
Wydawnictwo KUL, 2007), p. 20. 
8
 Ibid., p. 28. 
9
 D. Miller, ‘Communitarianism: Left, Right and Center’, in: Liberalism and Its Practice, ed. D. Avnon, 
A. de-Shalit (London-New York, Routledge, 2005), p. 142. 
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Rawls, and in the nineteenth century by Kant’s ethical concepts. Instead, liberal 
communitarians share a belief ‘that both the availability of a spectrum of ways of life 
and the capacity for autonomy depend upon a communal background’.10 And finally, 
thinkers constructing this political ‘third way’ diagnose and accept the inevitability of 
cultural diversity of contemporary societies. They believe that different communities, 
as belonging to different ethical and political traditions, should be reigned in 
accordance with them, and not with the imperatives implied by some abstract 
philosophical theories. Thus liberal communitarians place their emphasis on concrete 
visions of the common good, deprecating in this way the politics of standardizing 
legislation. ‘The key idea in the liberal communitarian vision of things is that a political 
society should be made up of a plurality of communities which ought as far as 
possible to have the character of voluntary associations’.11 One could add to this 
short list of constitutive features an optional one – ethical perfectionism, which 
however in some variants of liberal communitarianism (namely those related to 
postmodernism, such as Gray’s) is at odds with anti-essentialism and subjectivism. 
 
The Liberal-Communitarian Character of British Idealism 
 
The thesis about the liberal-communitarian character of idealist thought has been 
advanced by such scholars as Gerald Gaus, Rex Martin, Avital Simhony, William 
Sweet and David Weinstein, who agree that at the beginning of the twentieth century 
British idealists were already leveling the same charges against liberalism as 
communitarians did over fifty years later. They did not however reject liberalism as 
such, but rather its particular variant, which was impossible  
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to reconcile with the acknowledgment of the primacy of community over individuals, 
ethical and legal contextualism over universalism and particular goods over abstract 
rightness. Also unlike communitarians, idealists did not hesitate to propose their own 
theory of rights, in this way intentionally binding the ‘language of rights’ with that of 
the ‘common good’, giving ‘a liberal, albeit non-individualist, theory of rights’.12 
The afore-mentioned scholars unanimously emphasize the importance of the 
idealist theory of rights, which consists of everything that is crucial in the context of 
liberal-communitarian dispute. The ‘social thesis’, characteristic of conservative and 
communitarian thought, is combined here with the acknowledgment of recognition as 
the foundation of social and political order, insistence put on bonum publicum and its 
linkage with individuals’ welfare, emphasis placed on the positive functions of 
legislation, and at the same time an appreciation of the importance of individuals’ 
spontaneous activities. Idealists’ juridical theories oppose the belief that the nature of 
relations binding the state with its citizens is fundamentally antagonistic as well as 
similarly confrontational visions of rights and communities. They are based on the 
rejection of methodological individualism, abstractionism, universalism and ethical 
subjectivism.  
As the elements of the idealist theory of rights determining its conciliatory, 
liberal-communitarian character, scholars usually list the social recognition thesis and 
the significance of the concept of the common good. It is worth expanding this list 
with the idealist vision of freedom and the role of individual and community rights and 
to examine all these factors more thoroughly. 
 
 
                                                 
12
 W. Sweet, ‘Individual Rights, Communitarianism and British Idealism’, p. 261. 
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Social Recognition and the Common Good 
 
Green wrote that every right consists of two, strictly connected elements: (1) a claim 
put forward by a person or a group of people ‘to the free exercise of some faculty’,13 
and (2) the recognition of the legitimacy of such a claim on the part of a community. 
To Bosanquet right ‘in a widest sense’14 is a moral claim recognized by the 
community. What is the nature of this claim and where does it come from? Its direct 
source is yearning for self-realization – this opinion unites the above-mentioned 
thinkers, although each of them understands it a bit differently. According to Green 
individuals project their visions of the moral ideal, which they later try to realize. 
There is a multitude of such visions, for they arise in the minds for example of 
hedonists seeking satisfaction in pandering to their carnal whims, perfectionists 
striving to master the abilities linked to particular sphere’s of existence, and people 
defending the orthodoxy of moral systems. Each of them, despite the differences, will 
require social support to achieve his goal. This support may take on a form of 
enabling acquiring, consuming, and owning goods, or merely ‘being left alone’. 
Bosanquet thought that at the end of all human efforts was the goal of realizing a 
coherent, highly developed personality. To Bradley individuals achieve such 
satisfaction only by participation in a whole free from their limitations, i.e. in a 
community.15 
What determines the legitimacy of particular claims? It is a community’s 
recognition that it could contribute to the common good. ‘Rights then are claims 
recognized by the State, i.e. by Society acting as ultimate authority, to the 
                                                 
13
 T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles of Political Obligation, in: idem, Works of Thomas Hill Green, 
ed. R.L. Nettleship, vol. 2 (London, Longmans, Green, and Co., 1890), § 139. 
14
 B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State (Aldershot, Gregg Revivals, 1993), p. 188. 
15
 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1959), p. 174. 
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maintenance of conditions favorable to the best life’.16 This vision of the common 
good is an emanation of the general will of a particular society, thus according to 
Green and Bosanquet,17 individuals are usually unaware of it. Since they cannot 
have full knowledge as to the ‘congeries of the hopes and fears’18 or the ‘system of 
ideas’19 (this is how Green and Bosanquet defined the general will), they cannot be 
aware of the nature of goals designated by these enigmatic structures. Hence, if 
community is to follow the path desired by all its members, it is unnecessary to 
designate it explicitly, and its democratic selection is even less important. On the 
other hand, getting to know such goals is practically almost impossible. A very 
imperfect, but still the most accurate way is to search for their reflection in communal 
morality and the legal system, in generally accepted hierarchies of goods and values. 
‘This unity–on the one side of the being for another, or the making oneself into an 
outward thing, and on the other side of the being for oneself–this universal substance 
speaks its universal language in the usages and laws of his people’.20 Rights express 
the nature of social union. They are a mirror reflecting its goals and, as such, are 
always of a local character, ascribable to particular societies, and not to some 
abstract ‘humanity’: ‘no rights are absolute, or detached from the whole, but all have 
their warrant in the aim of the whole’.21 This view was shared also by Bradley: ‘we 
have thus seen the community to be the real moral idea, to be stronger than the 
theories and the practice of its members against it, and to give us self-realization.  
 
                                                 
16
 B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 188. 
17
 T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles, § 121; B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the 
State, pp. 117, 155, 164, 191, 198-9, 202, 285. Cf. idem, Kingdom of God on Earth, in: idem, Essays 
and Addresses (London Swan Sonnenschein & Co., 1891), p. 116. 
18
 T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles, § 86. 
19
 B. Bosanquet, ‘The Reality of General Will’, in: Aspects of the Social Problem, ed. B. Bosanquet 
(London, MacMillan and Co., 1895), p. 325. 
20
 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 86. 
21
 B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 216. 
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And this is indeed limitation; it bids us say farewell to visions of superhuman morality, 
to ideal societies, and to practical ideals generally’.22 Similarly categorical statements 
may be found in Green’s Lectures on the Principles: ‘rights have no being except in a 
society of men recognizing each other as ϊσοι καί őμοιοι [equals]’.23 
The character of the claims recognized by society and reflected in its legal 
system is absolutely dependent on its vision of the common good. Rights, according 
to Green, may be ascribed only to (1) a ‘member of a society, and (2) of a society in 
which some common good is recognized by the members of the society as their own 
ideal good, as that which should be for each of them. The capacity for being 
determined by a good so recognized is what constitutes personality in the ethical 
sense’.24 The character of common good depends on two major factors: objective 
(historical and geopolitical determinants) and absolute (telos of human existence), 
and its two main attributes are: (1) its unavoidably moral character and (2) its 
coincidence with individuals’ personal good. It is moral, because (a) it consists of 
citizens’ beliefs regarding the desired ways of self-realization, and because (b) its 
achievement ends with their moral development. For the same reasons it coincides 
with their interests. 
Social recognition may be linked to the common good in at least two ways. 
Firstly, the citizens’ mutual recognition constitutes a system of values and positive 
rights, in which some scholars seek an expression of the common good. In this 
context it may be identified with a particular form of political system, where the 
tradition and citizens’ customs have the strongest impact on legislation (i.e. 
democracy), and which guarantees free acquisition of goods  
 
                                                 
22
 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 201. 
23
 T. H. Green, Lectures on the Principles, § 139. Cf. ibid., § 142-4. 
24
 Ibid., § 25. Cf. ibid., § 132, § 134, § 136. 
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at the same time eliminating financial inequalities, if only they hinder citizens’ moral 
development (i.e. social liberalism). This ‘procedural’ vision of the common good 
Maria Dimova-Cookson called ‘a society of equals’.25 However, there era weighty 
arguments against such an interpretation. The most significant objection is that it 
implies proceduralism and anti-teleology. Being oriented to the ‘rules of justice’, and 
not to communal telos, it contradicts fundamental premises of the idealists’ thought, 
ignoring its anti-Kantian and Aristotelian/Hegelian inspirations. 
The second interpretation of the common good points precisely to a telos of 
human existence – moral perfection. In this variant, the desired form of society is the 
one enabling individuals’ moral progress. Nothing is told here about its fundamental 
ethical ideals, nor its political form. These factors depend solely on the community’s 
general will, and thus also on its tradition and historical experiences. The ‘substantial’ 
interpretation significantly differs from the previous one. Here it is not the abstract 
procedures or political ideals which determine communities’ institutional structure. 
This role is played rather by the concepts of good shared by their members, ‘the 
institutions by which man is moralized, by which he comes to do what he sees that he 
must, as distinct from what he would like, express a conception of a common good; 
that through them that conception takes form and reality’.26 ‘Personal morality and 
political and social institutions can not exist apart, and (in general) the better the one 
the better the other. The community is moral, because it realizes personal morality; 
  
                                                 
25
 M. Dimova-Cookson, T. H. Green’s Moral and Political Philosophy. A Phenomenological 
Perspective (Basingstoke, Palgrave-Macmillan, 2001), p. 102. Cf. A. Simhony, ‘T. H. Green: the 
Common Good Society’, History of Political Thought, XIV (1993), pp. 122-45. In the same spirit 
Simhony suggests the existence of parallels between Green’s and Rawls’s theories (A. Simhony, 
‘Rights that Bind’, pp. 258-60). 
26
 T.H. Green, Lectures on the Principles, § 116. Cf. ibid., § 120.  
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personal morality is moral, because and in so far as it realizes the moral whole’.27 
Individuals’ moral beliefs and the community’s institutional structure are 
interconnected. They both constitute a harmony of peculiar ethical symbiosis. Thus 
Bosanquet compared society to a tree, for as the limbs and branches are 
codependent, so all the parts of society contribute to its unity and welfare, in this way 
realizing also the well-being of their own.28 
 
Negative Freedom – Positive Freedom. Negative Rights – Positive Rights 
 
The problem of recognition in the writings of the idealists’ is directly related to that of 
freedom. Green, Bradley and Bosanquet unanimously distinguish between its two 
types, most commonly referred to in philosophical debates. One of them is ‘juristic’ 
(Green) or ‘negative’ (Bosanquet, Bradley)29 freedom, which they identify with self-
determination, full autonomy, independence from others, absolute sovereignty. It has 
its enemies in rights, state, and other citizens (for they often stand in our way to 
satisfaction). Being in favor of this concept results in a vision of an ‘idiotic’ (gr. 
ίδιώτης) individual, undetermined in its volitional acts. 
The second kind of freedom is the ‘real’ (Green, Bradley), ‘political’ or ‘positive’ 
(Bosanquet, Bradley) one. According to idealists, enabling individuals to do whatever 
they think is right, does not mean that they will do what is worth doing. The 
assumption that everybody knows best what is right for him, is incorrect, for if the 
telos of human existence consists in moral perfection, the free person is the one 
                                                 
27
 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 188. 
28
 B. Bosanquet, Introduction to Second Edition, in: idem, The Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 
xxxiii. 
29
 T. H. Green, ‘On Different Senses of ‘Freedom’ as Applied to Will and the Moral Progress of Man’, 
in: idem, Works of Thomas Hill Green, vol. 2, § 8, § 17; B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the 
State, p. 124; F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 57. 
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heading towards it. Those who spend their lives seeking for pleasures not only lose, 
sometimes even permanently, their potential for self-realization. They often also 
deprive others of the same chance. Thus Green defines true freedom in three ways: 
(1) as a ‘maximum of power for all the members of human society alike to make the 
best of themselves’; (2) ‘the liberation of the powers of all men equally for contribution 
to a common good’; (3) ‘the true end of all our effort as citizens ... a positive power or 
capacity of doing or enjoying something worth doing or enjoying, and that, too, 
something that we do or enjoy in common with others’.30 Bosanquet wrote that ‘our 
liberty, or to use a good old expression, our liberties, may be identified with such a 
system considered as the condition and guarantee of our becoming the best that we 
have it in us to be, that is, of becoming ourselves’.31 Each of these statements 
implies positive self-determination, and not lawlessness, as a foundation of freedom: 
‘In one sense no man is so well able to do as he likes as the wandering savage. He 
has no master. There is no one to naysay him. Yet we do not count him really free, 
because the freedom of savagery is not strength, but weakness. The actual powers 
of the noblest savage do not admit of comparison with those of the humblest citizen 
of a law-abiding state. He is not the slave of man, but he is the slave of nature’.32 
Positive freedom consists in bending our will to that of something exceeding the 
finite, human ego. This may be a communal general will speaking through ‘my station 
and its duties’, or Bradley’s ideals of social and non-social perfection. The important 
thing is that being truly free means intentional striving for moral perfection, and not, 
as radical individualists have thought, maintaining the illusion of perfect autonomy. 
 
 
                                                 
30
 T.H. Green, ‘Lecture on ‘Liberal Legislation’’, p. 370-2. 
31
 B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 119. 
32
 T.H. Green, ‘Lecture on ‘Liberal Legislation’’, p. 371. Cf. F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 57. 
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The Determinants of Idealistic Liberal-Communitarianism 
 
Let us present then the features typical of the idealist vision of social and political life, 
resulting in its hybrid, liberal-conservative or liberal-communitarian character. As I 
have mentioned above, we must consider the following features: (1) 
Hegelian/Aristotelian teleology, (2) metaphysical foundation of politics, (3) ethical and 
legal contextualism, (4) constant idealist hesitation between unconditional 
acceptance of ‘my station and its duties’ and the ideals of social and non-social 
perfection, (5) the criticism of the liberal concept of negative freedom and the apology 
of freedom as positive self-determination and (6) individualism. 
 
1) Teleology 
Idealists took some terms to be functional33 and one of them is the notion of 
humanness. According to them it is impossible to determine the essence of humanity 
referring to the imperfect stages of peoples’ development. It can be done only by 
focusing on the moral ideal which is meant for them to be achieved. Bosanquet 
expressed it as follows:  
 
The most ordinary conception of growth involves maturity, and the term 
»nature« in Greek and Latin, as in English, can indicate not only what we are 
born as, but what we are born for, our true, or real, or complete nature. Thus 
the great thinkers of every age have been led to something like Aristotle’s 
conception … And so we find that the peculiar naturalness of the primitive and 
the simple is only an illusion, caused by the grater difficulty of recognizing the 
larger individuality which comes both of and to itself in the later and more 
complex phases of life.34  
 
                                                 
33
 A term popularized by MacIntyre in his After Virtue, but referring back to Aristotle (‘for the city-state 
is an end of the other partnerships, and nature is an end, since that which each thing is when its 
growth is completed we speak of as being the nature of each thing’ (Aristotle, Politics, I.I.8, transl. H. 
Rackham (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard University Press, 1959), p. 9)). 
34
 B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State, pp. 122-3. 
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Green referred to this matter in the same spirit. In his Lectures on the Principles he 
foresaw the failure of the liberal attempts to establish the essence of humanity on the 
basis of its hypothetical beginning (i.e. the state of nature).35 He emphasized that the 
aim of human existence is hidden not at its start, but rather at its end. Existence of 
such telos is assumed in each moral demand, for at the foundations of every ethical 
theory reposes a distinction between ‘what is’ and ‘what ought to be’.36 Bradley 
repeated this thesis: ‘Morality implies an end in itself; we take that for granted. 
Something is to be done, a good is to be realized’.37 The British idealists were very 
generous in their praise for Aristotle’s and Hegel’s conceptions, for they most 
thoroughly expounded the goal of human existence and the role played by 
community in its achievement. Both Green and Bosanquet ascribed to Plato and 
Aristotle the credit of ‘laying the foundation for all true theory of »rights«’,38 implying 
the teleological development of the state, similar to that of the living organisms. 
Green translated Aristotle’s ‘τό τί ήυ είναι’ as ‘what a thing has in it to become’39 and 
took it as a fundamental dictum of Aristotle’s thought. Not ‘γένεσις’ but ‘ούσία’ defines 
human nature. The British idealists took from Plato’s and Aristotle’s ethical theories 
also the aim of human development: the perfection of characters. In all these matters 
Hegel was just the modern continuator of the ancient Greeks.  
 
                                                 
35
 T.H. Green, Lectures on the Principles, § 32-50. 
36
 Idem, Prolegomena to Ethics, § 85. 
37
 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 65. 
38
 Ibid., p. 36. 
39
 F.H. Harris, The Neo-Idealist Political Theory. In Continuity with the British Tradition (New York, 
King’s Crown Press, 1944), p. 23. Harris, however, seems to be mistaken to ascribe this quotation to 
Aristotle’s Politics. Green’s formula what a thing has in it to become (T. H. Green, Prolegomena to 
Ethics, § 172, § 248, § 352), often appearing in a different form – what it has it in itself to become / 
which it has it in itself to become (ibid., § 187; idem, ‘On the Different Senses’, § 18, § 20; idem, 
Lectures on the Principles, § 151), is never mentioned in his works in relation to any of Aristotle’s 
writings. 
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2) The Metaphysical Foundation of Politics 
Although recent decades have seen the rehabilitation of Hegelian metaphysics, still 
the prevailing belief is that every theory founded on metaphysical grounds has to be 
excluded from the group of liberal concepts. At the beginning of the twentieth century 
the last attempt at establishing the metaphysical theory of the state and politics on 
the borderline between liberalism and conservatism was undertaken by Bosanquet.40 
After it had found its later continuation e.g. in the theories of universal consent by the 
‘early’ Rawls and Habermas, it suffered a heavy defeat from communitarians and 
ontologically agnostic postmodern liberals (such as J. Gray). Green and, following 
him, also Bradley and Bosanquet, claimed their political thesis were the outcome of 
epistemological, ontological and ethical considerations. From their perspective the 
role of the state and the duties of citizenship depended on the character and 
functions of the Absolute. It is obvious that this kind of quasi-theological (since such 
idealists as Green, Josiah Royce, and E. Caird identified the Absolute with the 
Christian God) view on politics is alien to modern and contemporary liberal thinkers, 
as well as to communitarians. Only one representative of this last tradition – the ‘later’ 
MacIntyre – who has argued for Aristotelian Thomism, praised the universal validity 
of Christian values against the relativist interpretations of Aristotle’s thought. The 
idealist philosophy resembles rather some conservative traditionalists (e.g. J. de 
Maistre, L. de Bonald, F. R. de Lamennais) and some  
 
                                                 
40
 Peter Laslett (P. Laslett, ‘Introduction’, in: Philosophy, Politics and Society. First Series, ed. P. 
Laslett, W. G. Runciman (Oxford, Basil Blackwell, 1956), p. vii) once referred to the history of political 
philosophy as to a period ‘between Hobbes and Bosanquet’, pointing to later explosion of 
philosophical minimalism, rejecting the general theories of society and politics. This thesis was later 
undermined by Quentin Skinner, who pointed out that Laslett overlooked such strictly philosophical (in 
Laslett’s own terms) treatises as Leo Strauss’s Natural Right and History and Eric Voegelin’s New 
Science of Politics, both published in 1952. 
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modern and contemporary conservatives (like C. L. von Haller, F. J. Stahl, E. 
Voegelin). The fact of the metaphysical consolidation of politics may also suggest the 
affinities with the liberal and metaphysical ‘early’ Rawls. There is a lot in favor of 
accepting such parallels. Most of all, as the neo-Hegelians did, Rawls connected 
essentialism with liberalism, for he located the foundations of the latter in human 
nature revealed in the psychological rights governing individuals in the hypothetical 
state of nature. Hence the only ‘natural’ legislation to Rawls (just as it was to Green) 
is the one realizing imperatives implied by the essence of humanity. 
 
3) Ethical and Legal Contextualism 
Perhaps this feature brings idealism closest to communitarism as well as to those 
types of conservatism, whose representatives relativized ethical and political norms 
to the traditions of particular communities (A. Müller). Here not so much Green as 
Bradley and Bosanquet with their concept of ‘my station and it’s duties’ resemble the 
Aristotelian, and later neo-Aristotelian, vision of virtue as fulfillment of duties imposed 
by community. A case in point here is MacIntyre’s After Virtue. Idealist opposition to 
the a priori reasoning and formality of Kantian ethics on one hand, and to 
abstractionism and methodological individualism of contractarians on the other, 
points to analogies also with other communitarian thinkers. Idealists anticipate 
Sandel’s critique of the ‘unencumbered self’, Taylor’s ‘social thesis’ and his diagnosis 
of the dialogical character of human existence and Walzer’s vision of the ‘spheres of 
justice’. Individuals living outside the social arrangements or, even only theoretically, 
distancing themselves from the community’s cultural heritage as well as their own 
past experiences and played social roles, are mere philosophical fictions, practically 
useless as well as dangerous. Consequently, also the political  
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and legal systems, allegedly realizing the imperatives of universal ethical theories, 
are marked with the same defects. They are to be rejected in favor of contextualism, 
that is, a belief that ethical standards characteristic of particular communal morality 
should constitute the principal source of the patterns of behavior. Living properly 
means contributing to the welfare of community. Being a good man means being a 
good citizen, neighbor, husband, parent. There is no humanness besides the social 
roles we fulfill and there are no ethical standards apart from the communal systems 
of values. 
 
4) Tension Between Cultural and Legal Relativism and Ethical Universalism 
Although the idealists were decidedly opposed to Kantian formal universalism, they 
did not fall into relativism. They rejected both the liberal language of universal human 
rights and Protagorean homo mensura doctrine. Although they have exposed 
themselves to the accusation of reducing the essence of morality to the contingent 
communal standards of behavior, they have successfully avoided it thanks to the 
already mentioned metaphysical foundation of politics. A perfect example of this is 
Bradley’s rejection of the relativist implications of ‘my station and its duties’ which has 
resulted in his recognition of the supra-social standards of behavior. In effect the 
author of Ethical Studies advances the postulates of the existence of ideals of social 
and non-social perfection.41 This is the only way in which it is possible to explain the 
fact of social changes occurring and the possibility of criticism of the established 
patterns of behavior. The works of Green and Bosanquet disclose universalistic 
inclinations with similar recognition of the possibility and legitimacy  
                                                 
41
 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 220; cf. P. P. Nicholson, ‘Bradley as a Political Philosopher’, in: 
The Philosophy of F. H. Bradley, ed. A. Manser, G. Stock (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1984), pp. 123-4. 
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of undermining the status quo.42 After all, each act of social criticism implies the 
existence of some ideals unfamiliar to the current social and political practices. These 
ideals change with cultural and historical context, but this does not contradict the 
thesis that there is only one goal of each human life. And this is the source of the 
constant idealist hesitation between recognizing the ethical primacy of the 
community’s authority and trusting your own conscience, allegedly articulating the 
norms of universal morality. 
This feature, being neither strictly liberal nor communitarian, is present in both 
these traditions. In the first one it reveals itself e.g. in a tension between opposition to 
metaphysical theories of politics and simultaneous defense of universal human rights 
(e.g. an issue present in John Gray’s and Richard Rorty’s writings).43 Similar friction 
is present in the theories of MacIntyre (the clash between ethical contextualism and 
Christian universalism), Taylor and Walzer (the clash between acceptance of cultural 









                                                 
42
 T.H. Green, Lectures on the Principles, § 143-4; B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the 
State, p. 140; idem, ‘The Duties of Citizenship’, in: Aspects of the Social Problem, p. 15. 
43
 J. Gray, Two Faces of Liberalism, (New York, The New Press, 2000), pp. 106-15; R. Rorty, 
Contingency, Irony, and Solidarity (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1989), pp. 92-4. 
44
 Ch. Taylor, Sources of the Self. The Making of the Modern Identity, (Cambridge, Mass., Harvard 
University Press, 2001), pp. 4-5; M. Walzer, Interpretation and Social Criticism (Cambridge, Harvard 
University Press, 1987), p. 28. 
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5) The Criticism of the Concept of Negative Freedom 
This point reveals the bonds linking idealist to conservative and communitarian 
thought. For although also the liberal tradition has shown the appreciation to the idea 
of positive freedom (J. S. Mill, A. de Tocqueville), for most of the nineteenth and 
twentieth centuries its main understanding of liberty pointed to independence from 
others.45 
Green, Bradley and Bosanquet decidedly opted for ‘positive’, ‘true’ and ‘political’ 
freedom, looking for its ideal not in lawlessness (Hegelian Willkür) but in a concrete 
way of self-determination (German Wille).  A free person is not the one capable of 
acting in accordance with his or her momentary wants. This blessed state may be 
ascribed to those only, who do what is worth doing, who do not squander their 
chances for further self-realization with an arbitrary behavior. As a matter of fact, 
freedom from every dependency is a mere illusion. After all, does it not imply the 
concept of a Cartesian subject, able to doubt everything whilst at the same time 
preserving its own identity? ‘Only nothing [as Bradley wrote] is quite free, and 
freedom is abstract nothingness. If in death we cease to be anything, then there first 
we are free, because there first we are–not’.46 
Idealists anticipate many of the later views on the problem of dualism of the 
concepts of freedom. A striking similarity may be found for instance with Gerard 
MacCallum and Charles Taylor, whose thesis were stated almost a century earlier by 
Bosanquet.47 MacCallum in his paper on ‘Positive and Negative Freedom’ diagnosed 
the artificiality of Isaiah Berlin’s strict division between the  
                                                 
45
 T.A. Spragens, Jr., ‘Communitarian Liberalism’, pp. 40-4. 
46
 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 56. 
47
 Cf. T. Baldwin, ‘MacCallum and the Two Concepts of Freedom’, Ratio, XXVI (1984), pp. 126-7. 
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two concepts of freedom.48 Every view on freedom presupposes three predicates: 
freedom of some x from some y to do some z. Also Bosanquet in his Philosophical 
Theory... holds that every concept of freedom implies a dual formula: being always 
‘freedom from some things as well as freedom to others’.49 Hence the criterion of 
choosing between particular freedoms (whether we call it negative or positive) is 
always the vision of some good estimated as valuable. Similarly Taylor, in his essay 
on ‘What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?’, after distinguishing two concepts of 
freedom pointed to the fact that their strict division is impossible.50 Thus in this 
distinction it is not the nature of freedom itself that is understood differently. After all 
in both cases it means obedience only to oneself. Freedom is a ‘condition relevant to 
our continued struggle to assert the control of something in us, which we recognize 
as imperative upon us or as our real self, but which we only obey in a very imperfect 
degree’.51 ‘The man is free who realizes his true self’.52 Consequently, in the case of 
positive freedom-negative freedom distinction, it is not the category of self-
determination that is crucial (since in both concepts freedom is defined with reference 
to self-determination), but rather the understanding of the true self. Is it to be 
identified with the undetermined self or the social self? Are we free only if we act in 
accordance with our momentary wants, or may these wants sometimes contradict our 
social, and thus true self? What is ‘independence’ and ‘autonomy’? By what kind of  
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 G. C. MacCallum, jr., ‘Negative and Positive Freedom’, in: Liberty, ed. D. Miller (Oxford, Oxford 
University Press, 1991), pp. 102-22. Cf. E. Nelson, ‘Liberty: One or Two Concepts of Liberty: One 
Concept Too Many?’, Political Theory, XXXIII (2005), pp. 59-60; J. Christman, ‘Saving Positive 
Freedom’, Political Theory, XXXIII (2005), pp. 5-6. 
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 B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 128. 
50
 Ch. Taylor, ‘What’s Wrong with Negative Liberty?’, in: Contemporary Political Philosophy. An 
Anthology, ed. R. E. Goodin, Ph. Pettit (Cambridge, Blackwell Publisher, 1997), pp. 418-28. 
51
 B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 118. 
52
 F. H. Bradley, Ethical Studies, p. 57. 
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deeds or moral dispositions are they realized? It is these questions that one has to 
answer before further considering the nature of freedom, and obviously it is 
impossible here to ignore metaphysical statements. A belief in the existence of strictly 
negative rights, i.e. ones that (1) give room for unhindered self-determination, (2) not 
imposing any concept of good, allowing individuals to freely choose from available 
ways of self-realization, is just an illusion. 
Not only in this way do idealists challenge the strict distinction between the two 
concepts of freedom. Green states that the positive conception of freedom 
presupposes the negative one, since self-realization requires unhindered choice, and 
negative freedom similarly presupposes the positive conception to have any sense at 
all. For the lawlessness is in itself as unjustified as coercing individuals in the name 
of some alleged good, which they yet do not comprehend. This is why the person 
defining freedom as absolute independence must make an assumption as to the 
goal, which is to be realized in this way. Bosanquet gave this argument an excellent 
form by saying that ‘the apparently negative has its roots and its meaning in the 
positive’.53 Every concept of freedom is based on some view of human nature. Hence 
the dispute on the issue of freedom should not concern the limits of actions, but 
rather the definition of the truly autonomous personality. 
 
6) Individualism 
In spite of many accusations of idealists’ alleged readiness to sacrifice freedom at the 
altar of abstract or, even worse, the only ontologically intrinsic being, i.e. community, 
recent years have resulted in a series of publications opting for the acknowledgment 
of idealist individualism. This kind of individualism, however, has nothing in common 
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 B. Bosanquet, The Philosophical Theory of the State, p. 127. 
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with the one usually associated with the liberal perspective. According to its liberal 
version, to which the distinction between the public and the private spheres is 
essential, the opportunity for self-expression and personal independence may be 
traced only in the privacy of one’s home and face-to-face relations.  
According to the idealists, the relation between public and private is not so 
uncompromising. One cannot simply distinguish oneself as a private person oneself 
as a citizen. This is why ‘We shall need a new individualism, vitalized through the 
groups. The member of a state will not be the unit of a crowd whether of persons or 
of groups, but the full individual, the many-sided activity, revealed and realized in the 
system of groups’.54  
Do we use other vocabulary in our private life than in public, are we motivated 
there by different ideals, hopes, values, do we act with support of different ‘systems 
of ideas’ or ‘impalpable congeries of the hopes and fears’? Can I, as a citizen, 
completely forget about my personal needs, and as a private person about the 
community I live in? The answer is no. Neither freedom nor individualism should be 
considered apart from the social whole. The most brilliant of all thieves, although his 
capabilities may fill his heart with pride, will never be a truly free man and his 
activities recognized as a manifestation of individualism. For the term does not point 
to the expression of useless or harmful originality. If the roles ascribed to us by 
society determine our character, then individualism, as an expression of that 
character, cannot be asocial. Not only its source, but also its aims are social by 
nature. The concept of negative freedom as well as the appreciation of originality 
gain twofold justification in the idealists’ writings. First, if the ‘true freedom’ of all the 
members of a community is to be realized, they should have the opportunity to 
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choose freely between possible ways of gaining satisfaction. Perfection requires 
responsibility, which one cannot learn without knowing the full consequences of ones 
deeds. Secondly, the goals of community coincide with the goals of the individuals. 
After all in both cases it is moving the citizens closer to realizing their τέλος – moral 
perfection. Consequently, nonconformism is a condition sine qua non, on one hand, 
of individualism, and on the other – of realizing the common good. Institutions should 
promote criticism, for only in this way may they diagnose and eliminate the obstacles 
to the development of the social whole. 
 
Conclusion 
As can be seen, some of those traits were usually ascribed to liberal, others to 
Aristotelian, conservative or communitarian traditions. The thought of the idealists 
displays doctrinal similarity with each of them. It is connected to the first one by its 
individualism, its insistence on the necessity of social criticism of the existing 
institutions and the acknowledgment of the importance of unrestricted seeking after 
self-realization. It is also connected to the twentieth century, neo-Kantian version of 
liberalism by the metaphysical foundation of politics (embodied, for example, in 
Rawls’s Theory of Justice, often criticized because of the priori assumptions 
underlying the concept of the ‘original position’). On the other hand, among the 
conservative/communitarian elements of idealists’ world-view should be counted: 
teleology, contextualism and the criticism of the concept of negative freedom and 
rights. Both liberalism and communitarianism resemble idealism with their tension 
between universalism and relativism. 
Seen in the light of David Miller’s list of three elements constitutive of the liberal-
communitarian standpoint – (a) acceptance of liberal democracy as an appropriate 
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plane for solving ethical dilemmas, (b) rejection of abstract universalism, and (c) 
acceptance of the fact of cultural and political diversity – British idealism seems to be 
perfectly compatible with all of them. Element (a) is implicit in both idealist 
individualism, and contextualism. The first one presupposes negative freedom and 
rights as the basis of the positive ones cherished by Green, Bradley and Bosanquet, 
and it leaves place for, and even recommends, the criticism of the institutions of 
social and political life. The second one, although it may legitimize both democratic 
and undemocratic governments (so long as they function in accordance with the 
imperatives of the general will), demands the acceptance of changes of social 
consciousness, which can be counted for a strictly democratic premise. Element (b) 
opposition to abstract universalism, manifests itself in the criticism of Kantian and 
contractarian visions of human nature, whereby both disregard true, environmental 
and historical determinants of individuals’ and communities’ development. This 
criticism results in the appreciation of methodological holism and 
Aristotelian/Hegelian contextualism suggesting the necessity of considering ethical 
and political imperatives of particular communities exclusively in the light of their 
customs. Similar reasons speak in favor of acknowledging the concurrence of idealist 
thought with (c) the acceptance of cultural and political diversity.  
Other features of idealist thought: teleology, an insistence in the metaphysical 
foundation of politics, and the support of positive freedom situate idealists among 
liberal communitarians favorably inclined towards (d) ethical perfectionism, as well as 
thinkers listed as liberal conservatists. We can count among them such thinkers as 
Locke, Condorcet, Bastiat, Constant, Tocqueville, J. S. Mill, J. H. Newman, Lord 
Acton, and of contemporary thinkers also e.g. Galston, Macedo, and Shklar.  
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Thus the six mentioned features, seemingly contradictory, harmoniously co-exist in 
idealist thought, determining its uniqueness as individualist, communitarian, liberal, 
conservative and progressive at the same time. Most famous contemporary Polish 
philosopher, Leszek Kolakowski, entitled one of his essays How to be a conservative-
liberal socialist? Lecture of the British idealists’ writings makes an impression that 
they were mostly concerned with the same issue. 
